Ownership structure and agency costs in the companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange Rabbani Alia, Sharifabadi Abbas Alimoradib,* aDepartment of Accounting, Malayer Branch, Islamic Azad University, Malayer, Iran bAssistant Professor, Department of Accounting, Petroleum University of Technology, Iran *the correspondent author
Online published on 4 March, 2015. Abstract The primary goal of companies is wealth maximization of owners, but because of conflict of interests, managers would not always maximize owner or owners` income. This issue could be explained by agency relations. With the formation of agency relation, agency costs are created because of conflict of interests between parties. Agency costs have adverse effect on company value; therefore companies try to control and reduce these costs. Many studies have previously investigated relations between different features of companies and agency costs. In this article we pay attention to the relationship between ownership structure and agency costs of the listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. Among different kinds of ownership, Institutional, corporate and managerial ownerships have been investigated as independent variables. To examine the hypotheses of the study combined cross-sectional regression has been used. Results of the study confirm a positive and significant relation between institutional ownership and agency costs and an a diverse significant relation between corporate ownership and agency costs, while no significant association between managerial ownership and agency costs could be found. Top Keywords Ownership structure, institutional ownership, corporate ownership, managerial ownership, agency costs, Iran. Top |